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Abstract In this paper, we put forward a new account of emergence called
“transformational emergence”. Such an account captures a variety of emer-
gence that can be considered as being diachronic and weakly ontological. The
fact that transformational emergence actually constitutes a genuine form of
emergence is motivated. Besides, the account is free of traditional problems
surrounding more usual, synchronic versions of emergence, and it can find
a strong empirical support in a specific physical phenomenon, the fractional
quantum Hall effect, which has long been touted as a paradigmatic case of
emergence.
1 Introduction
Current discussions about emergence have reached a stalemate. Either they
revolve around crafting metaphysically-loaded versions of the notion that fail
to have direct scientific relevance or empirical support, or they verge on de-
vising science-friendly versions that are metaphysically shallow. This paper is
about breaking this deadlock, by putting forward a new account of the concept,
called “transformational emergence” (hereafter [te]).
In section 2, we first propose an analysis of emergence in the light of which
we localize [te] in the conceptual landscape of the possible varieties of the
notion. On this basis, and after having given reasons why we believe [te] is
a variety of emergence in its own right (subsection 3.1), we turn to providing
a metaphysical account of it (subsection 3.2), which we operationalize to al-
low for empirically exemplifying it (subsection 3.3). We then compare [te] to
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its main competing accounts on the current philosophical market (subsection
3.4), and highlight the ways in which it solves or avoids most of the traditional,
vexing issues that the more widespread way of looking at emergence unavoid-
ably faces (subsection 3.5). Finally, in section 4, we show that the account has
strong empirical support.
2 Varieties of emergence
2.1 The hallmark of emergence
Emergence is an empirical relation between two relata, namely an emergent E
and its emergence basis B, such that the two following theses simultaneously
obtain:
– (dep) E is dependent on, or determined by, B; and yet
– (nov) E is novel with regard to, or autonomous from, B.
While a given emergent and its corresponding basis have to be of a same nature
(e.g. E and B can be events, properties, laws, etc.), their common nature may
vary depending on the underlying ontological framework one chooses to adopt
or the philosophical task one seeks to accomplish.
From a temporal perspective, (dep) and (nov) can be construed in two
different ways. In the case of (dep), the determinative relation going from B
to E can be considered as being either synchronic – it can be, say, consti-
tution –, in which case E and B are individuated differently in terms of the
“levels” to which they respectively belong (E will usually be said to belong to
a “higher-level” than its “underlying”, simultaneous basis B). Or, the deter-
minative relation going from B to E can be diachronic – for instance, it can
be causation –, in which case E can (but doesn’t need to) belong to the “same
level” as its antecedent basis B (for E and B can be distinctly individuated
by appealing to the different times of their occurrence). Analogously, when it
comes to (nov), one can consider E as being either hierarchically novel with
regard to its underlying and simultaneous basis B, or historically novel with
regard to its antecedent basis B, insofar as, for example, E exhibits in both
cases features that B simply doesn’t have.
Adopting the conventional notation that X lt denotes an entity X – what-
ever its exact nature – at time t and belonging to “level” l, one can devise the
concepts of synchronic and diachronic emergence on the following model:
El
′
t synchronically emerges on B
l
t (with l
′ > l) iff:
(deps) B
l
t synchronically determines (e.g. constitutes) E
l′
t ; and yet
(novs) E
l′
t is hierarchically novel with regard to B
l
t.
El
′
t′ diachronically emerges on B
l
t (with t
′ > t and l′ ≥ l) iff:
(depd) B
l
t diachronically determines (e.g. causes) E
l′
t′ ; and yet
(novd) E
l′
t′ is historically novel with regard to B
l
t.
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As they have been expressed, (dep) and (nov) are, both in their syn-
chronic and diachronic declinations, (i) obviously ambiguous and (ii) prima
facie in tension, for it can require some intricate speculation to convince that
a given entity E is at the same time dependent on, and novel with regard to, a
corresponding basis B. It is then not surprising that a great deal of the emer-
gentists’ energy turns out to be spent on finding (i) precise ways of capturing
or fleshing out (dep) and (nov) and (ii) ways of holding them together in a
non-contradictory fashion.
2.2 The conceptual landscape of emergence
There actually exist numerous approaches that have been put forward in order
to make sense of, and consistently reconcile, (deps) and (novs) or (depd) and
(novd). The landscape of the possible accounts of emergence is thus today
quite rich and complex. Accordingly, it can prove useful to compartmentalize
it with the help of the following two distinctions:
Epistemological vs. ontological emergence. Whereas it is usually the case that
(dep) is to be taken in an ontological sense, for it refers to a determinative
relation – e.g. constitution or causation – that is supposed to be “out there”
in the natural world, (nov) can be construed either epistemologically or on-
tologically, depending on whether the autonomy or novelty in question is to
be found in our representations of the natural world or in the natural world
itself. Examples of the former kind of novelty, associated with the so-called
“epistemological” version of emergence, are reductive unexplainability, unpre-
dictability, non-derivability of laws, the impossibility to describe in a lower-
level vocabulary, etc. By contrast, cases of ontological emergence usually go
along with the advent of new, irreducible laws, powers or properties.
Weak vs. strong emergence. As its name suggests, this distinction allows for
the possibility of a contrast between different degrees of a given type (e.g.
epistemological or ontological) of emergence.1 When it comes to forms of epis-
temological emergence, the weak/strong distinction marks a dividing line be-
tween cases of, say, unpredictability that hold only in practice or that are to be
relativized to a given epistemic situation at a given time, and cases of unpre-
dictability that are supposed to hold in principle. With regard to ontological
emergence, the weak/strong distinction can be appealed to in order to demar-
1 In this we follow Van Gullick (2001)’s suggestion. We must bring to the reader’s attention
that this construal of the weak/strong distinction is not the most widespread. It is indeed
often appealed to in order to mark a dividing line between what we have chosen to refer to
here as the epistemological versus the ontological character of emergence (see for instance
Smart 1981; or Bedau 1997). Accordingly and for example, whereas Bedau qualifies his own
account as “weak” – for it is to be contrasted with ontological accounts essentially based on
downward causation –, we will rather consider it as “strongly epistemological”, insofar as the
(epistemological) irreducibility involved has an objective – rather than merely subjective –
character. At the end of the day, this turns out to be purely terminological.
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cate between emergentist views that embrace more or less anti-reductionistic
commitments (e.g. while two synchronic, ontological emergentists are com-
mitted to the advent, upon emergence, of new causal powers, only the “weak”
emergentist also embraces – whereas the “strong” emergentist denies – super-
venience).
Fig. 1 A compartmentalization of the conceptual landscape of emergence.
It is noteworthy that the aforementioned distinctions cut across each other,
to the effect that, together, they can help compartmentalize the conceptual
landscape of emergence in eight different regions (see figure 1). Other distinc-
tions could be put forward to further refine this picture, but this coarse-grained
analysis is precise enough to constitute the starting point of the discussion to
come.
3 A new look at emergence
In this section, we probe a specific region of the conceptual landscape of
emergence that has been under-appreciated in recent discussions, namely di-
achronic, weakly ontological emergence. In particular, after having vindicated
the fact that diachronic emergence is emergence in its own right (section 3.1),
we put forward an account of [te]. We first devise it in a metaphysical sense
(section 3.2), before operationalizing it in a way that makes it possible to find
evidence that it can be exemplified in our world (section 3.3). Finally, after
having compared [te] to its neighboring accounts in the conceptual landscape
of emergence (section 3.4), we defend its fruitfulness in solving or avoiding
some traditional vexing issues that bear on the contemporary debates (section
3.5), but also in having a strong empirical support in contemporary science
(section 4).
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3.1 Preamble: diachronic emergence is emergence
Since the recent resurgence of emergence, different sets of fields have focused
on different specific parts of the conceptual landscape of emergence. In the
main context within which emergence has been – and still is – a hot topic,
namely the philosophy of mind, all of the philosophers’ attention seems to
have been systematically drawn on the synchronic varieties of the concept (see
table 1).
Epistemological Ontological
Weak Nagel (1961) Gillett (2002)
Strong Searle (1992) Popper (1977)
Table 1 Sample of varieties of synchronic emergence in the philosophy of mind. Nagel
is of course not to be considered as a philosopher of mind, but his account of emergence
is built upon a criticism of Broad (1925)’s emergence, which was supposed to capture the
mind/body relation.
Apart perhaps from some exceptions, synchronic varieties of emergence
fail to apply in a realistic way to situations encountered in the natural sci-
ences, where systems usually encapsulate an important temporal dimension
that seems to play a crucial role in any putative emergence ascription.2 To see
this, suffice it to draw the attention on the fact that most of the empirically-
informed accounts of emergence taking shape within the context of the natural
sciences are developed in an essentially diachronic fashion (see table 2).
Epistemological Ontological
Weak Rueger (2000) Wilson (2010)
Strong Bedau (1997) Humphreys (1997)
Table 2 Sample of varieties of diachronic emergence in philosophy of science.
Without formulating any hypothesis about the reasons of such a discrep-
ancy between both communities of philosophers in the way they make use of
emergence, it has to be noted that synchronic emergence is often claimed to
be the only “genuine” kind of emergence, diachronic emergence being simply
dismissed as a recent proposal that deviates too much from the “classical con-
ception”, which is usually traced back to Broad (1925)’s synchronic account
(see Kim 1999, p. 20; or Kim 2006, p. 555).
It is actually not difficult to resist such line of thought, particularly if one
chooses to evaluate the “classicality” of emergence in terms of its historical
2 A similar diagnosis is made, in the peculiar case of cognitive science, by Stephan (2006).
It should be noted that there of course exist in contemporary philosophy of science accounts
of emergence that encapsulate both a synchronic and a diachronic dimensions (e.g. Mor-
rison 2006; or Batterman 2011). To avoid any ambiguity, in what follows we then reserve
the generic term of “synchronic emergence” to denote accounts that can be considered as
“purely” synchronic.
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genesis. It indeed turns out that the first explicit characterization of emergence
to be found in history was essentially diachronic, though also concomitantly
synchronic. After Lewes’ somewhat anecdotal contribution in 1875, the first
philosophical doctrine that can be considered an emergentist school, namely
Lloyd Morgan’s “emergent evolutionism”, was indeed entirely built upon a
notion of emergence that was supposed to be the philosophical tool allowing a
reconciliation between Darwinian gradualism and the successive and incessant
advent of historical novelties in evolution, to the effect that “there is more in
the world to-day than there was in the primitive fire-mist” (Morgan 1913, p.
30). As a characterization of emergence that was supposed to achieve such a
reconciliatory job, we can find in Morgan’s writings that there is emergence at
play, for example in the chemical synthesis of two compounds, when (depx)
the synthesized compound is the product of the reactants and (novx) the syn-
thesized compound has “new and distinctive properties which are not merely
the algebraic sum of the properties of the component things prior to synthe-
sis” (Ibid., p. 28, our italics). As an operationalization of (novx), Morgan
proposed that these new properties were “unpredictable from what one may
perhaps speak of as the fire-mist’s point of view” (Ibid., p. 30). This being
said about what certainly is the most “classical” construal of emergence, one
may wonder whether clauses (depx) and (novx) turn out to be something else
than a particular version of (depd) and (novd). “Classical” emergence is then
clearly (also) diachronic emergence
3.2 Transformational emergence: a metaphysical account
This being said, we can turn to providing a new account of one possible dec-
lination of diachronic emergence, namely [te].
To start with, let us consider a natural system S at two successive times t1
and t2 of its evolution. One will say – and in this lies the general, metaphysical
account of [te] – that the given system at t2 (S2) transformationally emerges
from the same system at t1 (S1) if and only if there exists a transformation
[Tr] such that:3
– (depd) S2 is the product of a spatiotemporally continuous process going
from S1 (for example causal, and possibly fully deterministic). In particu-
lar, the “realm” R to which S1 and S2 commonly belong (e.g. the physical
realm) is closed, to the effect that nothing outside of R participates in S1
bringing about S2.
4 And yet:
3 Whereas we claim that, as such, the account proposed here is unprecedented in the
literature, it is of course not without forerunners. In particular, we owe a great debt of
gratitude to Paul Humphreys, who presented to us the original idea and coined the term
“transformational emergence”. A similar intuition is also to be found in Ganeri (2011),
though in a very different context.
4 As it has been stated, what (depd) tolerates is that contextual elements jointly partici-
pate with S1 to bring about S2. What (depd) denies, though, is that these elements act as
radically extrinsic influences that should bring the novelty in emergence from the outside. It
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– (novd) S2 exhibits new entities, properties or powers that do not exist in
S1, and that are furthermore forbidden to exist in S1 according to the laws
{Li1}ni=1 governing S1. Accordingly, different laws {Li2}mi=1 govern S2.
It is noteworthy that the “forbidden” expression occuring in (novd) in-
troduces a modality aspect to [te], according to which, upon emergence, an
ontological domain that was previously barred – including entities and their
properties, subject to specific laws – becomes accessible.5 It should also be em-
phasized that, at best, the sets of laws {Li1}ni=1 and {Li2}mi=1 partially overlap.
It is indeed part of the account that at least one law La2 of S2 is inconsistent
with the set {Li1}ni=1.6
In a nutshell, the proposed account operates a perspective shift with re-
gard to the more usual way of looking at emergence. The general frame one
has generally in mind when making an emergence ascription is schematically
captured in the upper left corner of figure 2. When some given n1-level en-
tities in isolation at time t1 – be they atoms, cells or organisms – are put
together in a specific configuration at time t2, they can collectively give rise
to a hypothetical n2-level whole. On this basis, one can choose to adopt two
different perspectives in order to formulate an emergence ascription. On the
one hand, and this is the most widespread, usual way of looking at this, one
can consider there being emergence because of the very special nature of the
inter-level determinative relation [C] that occurs between the parts and the
putatively emergent whole at t2 (case (i) on figure 2) and, accordingly, one can
leave aside or abstract away the historical process prior to t2. Here the real
drive of emergence is to be localized in a synchronic part-whole relation [C]
of a very special nature – e.g. as capturing the conjunction of (mereological)
supervenience (deps) and irreducibility (novs). In this first respect, one often
rhetorically claims that “the whole is more than the sum of its parts” or that
“more is different”.
On the other hand, and this is the perspective shift encapsulated in [te],
one can choose to leave aside these holistic considerations and ground an emer-
gence ascription in a transformation [Tr] of a very special nature, which the
entities at t1 encounter upon entering into their interactive configuration at
t2 (case (ii) on figure 2). Here the real drive of emergence is to be found in
a diachronic determinative relation [Tr] that captures (depd) and (novd) as
formulated above (and to be operationalized below). In contrast with the more
widespread way of looking at emergence, here one can claim that “the whole
is the sum of the transformed parts” or that “after is different”7.
should also be pointed out that we take determinism to mean that, should S’s evolution be
deterministic, S’s history would be univocally fixed. This doesn’t entail that S’s future evo-
lution can be predicted (Earman 2007), nor that previously inexistent laws cannot appear
now and then during S’s evolution (Sartenaer 2015).
5 This definition supposes that S’s dynamics is entirely captured by the relevant set of
natural laws.
6 We thank an anonymous reviewer for having drawn our attention on this point.
7 As the first of these slogans makes clear, the very notion of a “whole” is radically deflated
in the transformational perspective, as it is claimed to be simply identical with – or reducible
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Fig. 2 A perspective shift on emergence. One can ground any emergence ascription by
putting the burden of a suitable reconciliation of (dep) and (nov) either on (i) the synchronic
relation [C] between levels or (ii) the transformational relation [Tr] between successive
times.
3.3 The epistemic effects induced by transformational emergence
This far, we have cooked up an account that captures a relation that remains
something like a mere metaphysical possibility not yet fully investigated by
philosophers. Even restricted to this, [te] already offers several non-negligible
advantages over some of its competitors on the philosophical market and, as
such, it is worthwhile to consider it as a convenient theoretical tool to solve
or avoid some traditional issues surrounding the emergence/reduction debate,
while preserving some strong intuitions about emergence (see in particular
section 3.5). However, we have reasons to think that [te] captures more than
a metaphysically plausible relation. As we will show in section 4, we believe
there are empirical cases of [te] in our world. In this respect, beside being of
possible interest for metaphysicians, [te] has also some philosophical work to
do in the natural sciences.
to, in the synchronic sense – the sum of its transformed parts (the notion of “sum” is taken
here metaphorically, as a way of echoing the traditional slogan; it can actually capture
any kind of combinatorial principle, linear or not). Accordingly, one can of course still talk
about wholes or collectives, but this is simply a linguistic shortcut that doesn’t have any
ontological import over and above what happens at the level of the parts (which is the only
ontologically significative level). Of course, one could combine this diachronic and “flat”
approach to emergence with a synchronic and hierarchical perspective, and hence devise an
hybrid notion that encapsulates both the perspectives discussed here. But this simply isn’t
[te] as we conceive of it.
A New Look at Emergence. Or When After is Different 9
To see this, it is necessary to provide beforehand what we consider an op-
erationalization of [te], that is, a translation of its underlying metaphysical
intuitions into formal requirements that can enter into dialogue with the sci-
ences. Because we cannot claim to have a privileged and direct access to the
ontology of natural systems, the best we can do is to recast ontological claims
like (depd) and (novd) into claims about the traces that [Tr] leaves in the
formal constructs we use to investigate these natural systems, on the following
model (see also figure 3):
Fig. 3 The traces that [Tr] leaves in our way of investigating S.
– (C1) M1 and M2, which both describe the same system at two successive
stages S1 and S2 of its evolution, are models of one and the same non-trivial
theory T . And yet:
– (C2) M2 is not derivable from M1 as a matter of principle, for M2 contains
features that are forbidden in M1 according to theory T . More precisely,
S2’s dynamics as described by M2 is not continuously deformable into S1’s
dynamics as described by M1.
8
As intended, (C1) and (C2) capture the epistemic effects induced by the
ontology of [te] and, as such, they are also the best available pieces of evidence
8 Here we take “dynamics” in an unrestricted sense that can be distinctively implemented
in different disciplinary contexts, and that can be construed as whatever fixes the possible
kind of evolution of a system with respect to a given model. In the case of physics, one can
expect to detect (C2) into what codes for the dynamics of systems, namely their Lagrangian
or Hamiltonian. It is noteworthy that focusing on the way in which the dynamics evolves
has already been considered elsewhere as the best way to ground claims about what counts
as “truly” novel or not in the evolution of a physical system. See for instance Rueger 2000
or Morrison 2006. It is also noteworthy that here we take [Tr] as what leads from S1’s
dynamics to S2’s dynamics, but not as a dynamical process in itself. As with respect to the
possible relation between laws and dynamics, the scope of this paper compels us to remain
agnostic.
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– at least when they are successfully met in a given situation – that there is
[te] at play. (C1) states that S1 and S2 are states of one and the same system
or, to put it differently, that S1 and S2 are states of a same kind, defined
by theory T . Nothing exterior to the realm R to which S1 and S2 commonly
belong, and which should be modeled in the context of another theory T ′, is at
stake in [Tr]. Through in-principle non-derivability, (C2) captures the effect
of the novelty involved in [te]. The fact that it is impossible to describe S2’s
dynamics in M1, that is, to describe S2’s dynamics as a smooth deformation
of S1’s dynamics, combined with the idea that a system’s dynamics as we
capture it through our model is the best (and only indirect) access we have
to the system’s ontology, constitute the most convincing clue that S2 exhibits
new features that are forbidden to exist, according to natural laws, in S1. As an
epistemic side-effect, it also follows from (C2) that, prior to t2, it is impossible
in principle to predict or etiologically explain the nature and behavior of S2
from complete knowledge of S1 (though this is possible from knowledge of
theory T and the appropriate conditions that define S2).
As we will see in section 4, the way of physically cashing out [Tr] will
be accomplished through the notion of a transition between distinct topo-
logical orders: there will be [te] in our world as soon as a given system ex-
hibits a transformation such that its post-transformation state corresponds
to a state of matter in a topological order that is not accessible to any
of its pre-transformation states, according to the laws governing these pre-
transformation states.
3.4 Transformational emergence in the conceptual landscape of emergence
At this point, it can prove helpful to localize [te] in the conceptual landscape
of emergence exposed in section 2.2. In particular, [te] lies in the region of
diachronic, weakly ontological varieties of the notion (see figure 4).
As it is already clear in the account proposed above, [te] is a diachronic
relation, as the putative emergent and its basis are related by a temporally
extended determinative relation that allows for the advent of historical novel-
ties. [te] is also ontological, for it leads to the advent of new entities, powers,
forces and laws in nature, and this in spite of the fact that transformational
emergents are the continuous products of their bases. Of course, as we have
seen, such additions to the world’s ontology are systematically accompanied
by principled epistemological effects – non-derivability of models, etiological
unexplainability and unpredictability –, which we can use – and, as it turns
out, which we will use below – as evidence in favor of the existence of trans-
formational emergents in our world. Finally, [te] is only ontological in a weak
sense, insofar as it is a monism-friendly relation. If one considers S as being
a physical system, the emergence of a state S2 on a previous state S1 indeed
turns out to be perfectly consistent with physicalism as well as with the causal
closure of the physical world.
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Fig. 4 [te] as a form of diachronic, weakly ontological emergence, which can be seen as
a moderation of Humphreys (1997), a reification of Rueger (2000), or a temporalization of
Hendry (2010)’s accounts of emergence.
This being said, we can now compare [te] to its neighboring accounts in
the conceptual landscape of emergence (see again figure 4). A first way of
looking at [te] is as a moderation of Humphreys’ original “fusion account”
(Humphreys 1997). If one considers P im(x
i
r)(t) as being the instantiation of an
i-level property P im by an i-level entity x
i
r at time t, and [.∗ .] as being the “fu-
sion operation”, then fusion emergentism states that [P im(x
i
r)(t)∗P in(xis)(t)] =
[P im∗P in][(xir)+(xis)](t′) and [P im∗P in][(xir)+(xis)](t′) = P i+1l (xi+1l (t′)). Among
the ideas encapsulated in these expressions, there is the fact that fusion is a
diachronic operation (t′ > t), which gives rise, from i-level property instances,
to an (i + 1)-level property instance [level jump], and which is such that, at
t′, the fused property instances have ceased to exist as separate entities [basal
loss]. Consequently, there is no supervenience of P i+1l (x
i+1
l )(t
′) on any under-
lying, simultaneous basis, there is no threat of causal overdetermination that
could prevent us from considering that P i+1l (x
i+1
l )(t
′) can exert its own (irre-
ducible) causal powers, and causal closure breaks down. On this basis, fusion
emergentism states that P i+1l (x
i+1
l )(t
′) emerges – in a diachronic, strongly
ontological sense – from P im(x
i
r)(t) and P
i
n(x
i
s)(t).
9
As such, fusion emergentism faces at least two issues. First, it is not clear
that the account can be empirically exemplified (Kronz & Tiehen 2002), de-
spite Humphreys’ own “reasonably confident” claim that quantum entangle-
ment constitutes the basis for such an exemplification. Second, the whole ac-
count heavily rests on the existence (and the definability) of a discrete hierar-
chy of levels, a commitment that Humphreys himself considers “misleading and
probably false” (Humphreys 1997, p. 5), but that he nonetheless accepts as a
9 The diachronic and ontological nature of fusion emergence is obvious from what has
just been said. The fact that it is strongly ontological has to be contrasted with the weakly
ontological character of [te]. As we’ve seen, [te] actually tolerates causal closure as well as
supervenience, beside not being committed to the existence of high-level causal powers.
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hypothesis given the initial rationale of the fusion account, namely formulating
a plausible theory of emergence that is immune to generalized exclusion-style
arguments, according to which some minimal dependence relation between
levels is incompatible with genuine high-level causation.
Now one is in a position to appreciate why Humphreys himself seems to
have recently given up on fusion emergentism in favor of something along the
lines of [te] (Humphreys, unpublished). For one thing, the initial rationale
for cooking up fusion emergence, namely to avoid exclusion-style worries, is
perfectly met by [te] (see section 3.5). Furthermore, this is achieved without
falling into the issues mentioned above, which fusion emergentism faces. In-
deed, [te] has a stronger empirical support (see section 4) and no misleading
account of a discrete hierarchy of levels has to be hypothesized (see also section
3.5).
In 1997, fusion emergentism was an unprecedented move from the syn-
chronic view of emergence towards a pioneering diachronic account better
suited to capture the specific nature of physical systems. In 2016, [te] consti-
tutes a new step in the same direction, by getting rid of the last problematic
remnants of the synchronic view with which fusion emergence is somewhat still
marred, namely the features that are tied to commitments about the existence
of a discrete natural hierarchy, like level jump, (failure of) supervenience or
high-level causation.
When it comes to localizing [te] in the conceptual landscape of emergence,
a second account onto which it is interesting to draw one’s attention is Rueger
(2000)’s rather idiosyncratic account. In a nutshell, it consists in asserting that
a system’s behavior S2 at time t2 is emergent on the same system’s behavior
S1 at time t1 iff the following thesis obtains:
10
– (novd) The phase space portrait that would describe S2 during a time
lapse where no environmental parameter is modified is not topologically
equivalent to the phase space portrait that would describe S1 during a
time lapse where no environmental parameter is modified.
By topological non-equivalence between phase state portraits, it is meant that
there is no smooth transformation that could convert the phase state trajectory
of S2 (during a time lapse where no environmental parameter is modified) into
the phase state trajectory of S1 (during a time lapse where no environmental
10 The way we formulate Rueger’s novelty thesis here is somewhat cumbersome, but we
don’t know of a better way to phrase it, insofar as it rests on a confusion within Rueger’s own
account. At some point, Rueger indeed states that the relata of emergence are the behavior
of a system at a given moment and the behavior of the same system at some earlier moment
(typically when, in between, a critical point in a control parameter has been reached; see p.
300). But at some other places (p. 303), the relata of emergence are supposed to be a given
system (for which a control parameter is at critical value) and another so-called ”reference”
system (for which the control parameter is not at critical value). Perhaps the fact that both
interpretative options are available is the reason why Rueger doesn’t explicitly formulate a
dependence thesis, for it doesn’t fully make sense in the second case. In any case, we embrace
the first option here – viz. when the relata of emergence are successive behaviors of one and
the same system –, for we think it captures Rueger’s intuition and it involves embracing a
dependence thesis along the lines of (depd).
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parameter is modified). Typically, for S2 to emerge on S1, it is then necessary
that, between t1 and t2, some control parameter reach a critical value corre-
sponding to a bifurcation into the behavior of S. Qualitatively novel – hence
emergent – behaviors are also considered by Rueger to be “irreducible”, in the
non-commonsensical “intralevel” sense that S2’s description doesn’t “smoothly
go over” into S1’s description in the appropriate limit of the control parameter.
Rueger’s account of emergence can be considered as diachronic and weakly
epistemological.11 It is epistemological, insofar as the criteria for emergence
– topological non-equivalence and (intralevel) irreducibility – are about rela-
tions between descriptions of behavior. And it is epistemological in a weak
sense, as it is compatible with in-principle – and actually even with practical –
predictability or etiological explainability of the emergents from knowledge of
their basis.12 On this basis, one can consider [te] as a reification or an ontolo-
gization of Rueger’s emergence, where qualitative novelty between successive
behaviors of a given system is not to be restricted to a mere descriptive fea-
ture, but has rather to do with genuine additions to the system’s ontology.
More precisely, instead of merely considering that, upon emergence, the phase
space portrait of a system can be modified in a discontinuous way, [te] requires
that whole areas of the system’s phase space, which were prohibited according
to the natural laws governing the pre-emergence state, become accessible to
the system upon emergence. Accordingly, the epistemological effect of such
an ontological novelty is more drastic than the one associated with Rueger’s
account: with [te], “intralevel irreducibility” amounts to in-principle unpre-
dictability or etiological unexplainability from knowledge of any pre-emergence
state. A consequence of [te] being more ontologically engaged than Rueger’s
emergence is that it is more philosophically fruitful – it has higher stakes with
regard to scientific practice – but less empirically mundane.
Finally, a third neighboring account of [te] has recently been put forward
by Hendry (2010). Hendry’s account essentially rests on what he refers to as
a “counternomic criterion”, according to which the behavior of an emergent
entity would be different were it determined only by the laws that govern its
composing sub-entities. Framed along the lines we have chosen to use in this
paper, Hendry’s criterion is basically that a given entity E is emergent on a
basis B as soon as the following obtain:
11 Rueger himself qualifies his account as “weak”, but this seems to cover what we refer
to here as “epistemological”. For him, “weakly” emergent properties are indeed proper-
ties that are also structural or “resultant”, that is, properties that are defined in terms of
lower-level properties and relations (in the diachronic, purely intralevel case, this notion
is somewhat degenerate). This is in sharp contrast with ontological accounts that consider
non-structurality as a necessary (but not necessarily sufficient) requirement for emergence
(e.g. Humpheyrs 1997 in the diachronic case; O’Connor 1994 in the synchronic case).
12 This can be seen on the basis of the empirical illustration of Rueger’s diachronic emer-
gence that is the originally damped oscillator that becomes undamped (so the control pa-
rameter – the damping – reaches its critical null value). There is emergence in this context,
for the undamped oscillator has a phase space portrait that looks like an ellipse, whereas
the phase space portrait of the damped oscillator is a topologically non-equivalent spiral. In
spite of this emergence, one could thoroughly predict in practice what would be the behavior
of an undamped oscillator from knowledge of the laws governing its damped counterpart.
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– (deps) E is composed of B; and yet
– (novs) New, sui generis laws govern the behavior of E, conferring it new,
irreducible causal powers (and, in particular, downwardly oriented causal
powers).
This is obviously an ontological account of synchronic emergence and, as
such, Hendry is in need of operationalizing it in order to investigate its possible
empirical exemplifications. This is achieved through a strategy we will also use
in section 4 with regard to [te], namely recasting thesis (novs) (in our case
(novd)) into terms about what captures the ontology of laws and powers –
physicists would say “dynamics” – in physical systems, viz. their Hamiltonians
(or, in our case, their Lagrangians). Here is (our reconstruction of) the core of
Hendry’s move in this respect:
– (CH1 ) The Hamiltonians capturing the dynamics of E and B are models
of one and the same non-trivial theory T , namely quantum mechanics.
Accordingly, E and B are both quantum-mechanical systems. And yet:
– (CH2 ) E’s dynamics is captured by a “configurational” Hamiltonian, i.e. a
Hamiltonian that is not resultant from – or is of an “independent kind” of
Hamiltonian with regard to – the Hamiltonians that capture the dynamics
of B.
According to Hendry, molecular structures meet his counternomic criterion
and, in its wake, (CH1 ) and (C
H
2 ). Accordingly, molecular structures are on-
tologically emergent from a quantum mechanical basis made of electrons and
nuclei interacting via Coulomb forces. In Hendry’s view, molecular Hamilto-
nians are then cases of configurational Hamiltonians, and hence cannot be
seen as merely resulting from underlying atomic Hamiltonians. This formal
fact is appealed to in order to justify the ontological fact that molecules do
have powers irreducible to that of their underlying elements – electrons and
nuclei –, and the former obey sui generis laws that do not govern the behavior
of the latter.13 This can be empirically motivated: as cases of isomers attest,
molecular structures play a causally relevant role in many chemical phenom-
ena through their symmetry properties, although these properties cannot be
traced to – nor recovered from – atomic considerations.14
In the terminology we are by now used to, Hendry’s emergence can be
considered as a form of synchronic, weakly ontological emergence. The fact
that it is synchronic – and hence hierarchical – as well as ontological – and
13 Of course the fact that irreducible (classes of) Hamiltonians are supposed to mirror
irreducible laws and powers is questionable, especially given that philosophers of science
sometimes consider Hamiltonians as being mere models. We think nonetheless that this is
a key component of Hendry’s intuition about the relationship between physics and meta-
physics.
14 It is at this point that Hendry appeals to a specific construal of the Born-Oppenheimer
approximation, which is systematically used in order to be able to solve molecular
Schro¨dinger equations that otherwise would remain untractable. According to Hendry, far
from being a mere approximation, this procedure leads to adding a structure to molecules
by hand, insofar as it involves breaking the symmetry of what the solutions (of spherical
symmetry) to the exact molecular Schro¨dinger equation would be.
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hence induces principled epistemic effects – is obvious from the reconstruction
laid down above. It is also weakly ontological in the sense that it remains
ontologically shallow with regard to other accounts of synchronic ontological
emergence that involves non-structurality, a failure of supervenience, unreal-
ized powers or a denial of physicalism.15 In this respect, Hendry’s emergence
constitutes a synchronic counterpart to [te], or the latter can be seen as a tem-
poralization – i.e. a conversion of level discreteness into temporal ordering –
of the former.
3.5 Transformational emergence: some advantages
In this final subsection before turning to providing empirical support for [te],
we stress the sense in which the account solves or avoids some traditional issues
that surround the current debates about emergence, while keeping untouched
the main stakes and intuitions that underlie most of the uses of the concept.
As we’ve already touched upon above, one first advantage of [te] is that the
account doesn’t need to posit a discrete hierarchy of levels of nature, within
which each system should find a proper place. Such a feature of [te] actually
constitutes the core of the perspective shift that the account captures, in the
light of which the drive of emergence is to be found in the way some enti-
ties are temporally – instead of hierarchically – related. In a word, [te] can
thus perfectly tolerate a thorough hierarchical egalitarianism. Of course, this
doesn’t entail that organization, collective behavior, composition, etc., don’t
have an important role to play in the nature or in the representation of natu-
ral systems. Rather, these notions are secondary when it specifically comes to
ascriptions of [te], and can be seen under a deflationary, heuristically-inclined
perspective about levels (e.g. construed in terms of scales; see Potochnik &
McGill 2012). From the outset, such an ontological indifference about hier-
archies makes [te] well-suited for scientific contexts where level-talk always
seems artificial and problematic, e.g. in physics.
As a beneficial side-effect of this, [te] is not threatened by exclusion-style
arguments, which can be devastating for synchronic versions of ontological
emergence (see, for instance, Kim 1999). In a nutshell, those types of argu-
ments are devised to show that the conjunction of some construals of (deps)
and (novs) are plainly inconsistant with some highly plausible metaphysical
theses like the causal closure of the physical world and the impossibility of sys-
tematic causal overdetermination. In the face of such worries, and if they don’t
want to simply get rid of emergence altogether by giving up either on (deps)
– hence moving towards dualism – or (novs) – hence embracing reduction-
ism –, synchronic emergentists tend to be forced to making bold moves like,
15 True, Hendry’s account leads to a breaking of the causal closure of physics, but it remains
consistent with the weaker principle that is the “ubiquity of physics”, according to which
“physical principles constrain the motions of particular systems though they may not fully
determine them” (Hendry 2010, p. 188).
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to mention but one example, introducing an exotic and unprecedented, nei-
ther causal nor compositional, determinative relation like “machresis” (Gillett
2010). By contrast, [te] is unconcerned with exclusion worries, for the simple
reason that transformational emergents do not causally compete with their
bases – so there isn’t a risk of facing causal overdetermination –, since these
are not simultaneously instantiated. More specifically, there is also no room
in [te] for the controversial notion of downward causation – or any peculiar
declination of it, under the form of downward constraint, regulation or deter-
mination –, so there is no need to settle long-standing disputes about whether
causation should be seen as productive or counterfactual, synchronic or di-
achronic, efficient or also formal, etc. in order to devise the account. As such,
the prima facie plausibility of [te] as a legitimate version of emergence un-
dermines Kim’s contention that “downward causation is the very raison d’eˆtre
of emergence, but it may well turn out to be what in the end undermines it”
(Kim 2006, p. 548).
It is important to note that, even if [te] gets rid of tenets that play a crucial
role in other forms of ontological emergentism, it preserves the most important
intuitions of the doctrine. First, as far as causation is concerned, [te] captures
the idea that the advent of emergents makes a difference in the world, in the
spirit of the so-called anti-epiphenomenalist dictum of Alexander – “To be
real is [...] to possess causal powers” –, without having to adopt a dualistic
stance. The new causal powers that arise through [te] can even be said to
be “irreducible” in most of the usual senses of the word. As a consequence
of (novd), and more particularly of the clause stating that transformationally
emergent powers are forbidden to exist, according to natural laws, prior to
their emergence, transformationally emergent powers are not identical to the
powers of their bases, they are not a subset of the powers of their bases, they
are not realized in the powers of their bases – so there is no issue of “causal
inheritance” between them –, they are not the mere manifestation of some
initially latent powers of their bases, etc.
Second, with respect to epistemological concerns, [te] preserves the intu-
ition that emergents are non deducible, not predictable or not explainable from
complete knowledge of their bases. And what matters here is that [te] does
so without having to be committed to some problematic ideas like downward
causation or that emergents are brute, sui generis empirical facts that must be
“simply swallowed whole with that philosophic jam which Professor Alexander
calls ‘natural piety”’ (Broad 1925, p. 55). As we will indeed see in section 4,
there can be a perfectly legitimate physical explanation of why transforma-
tional emergents are to appear at some point in the evolution of systems. Of
course, the fact that one can explain the advent of transformational emergents
seems to be in conflict with the idea that transformational emergents are in
some sense unexplainable in principle. The conflict envisioned here is actually
simply apparent : transformational emergents are unexplainable in principle
from knowledge of their bases, but they are not unexplainable tout court, to
the effect that [te], in contrast with classic emergent evolutionism, does not
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have to fall into obscurantism.16 Put differently, when it comes to providing
illumination about the advent of transformational emergents, [te] states that
some explanatory paths are forever impracticable – typically the paths going
directly from the bases to the emergents –, but not that no explanatory path
whatsoever should be available.
To summarize, [te] is a bona fide account of emergence that makes sense
of the very hallmark of the notion, namely a reconciliation of theses (dep)
and (nov). It does so in a diachronic fashion, consistently with some of the
original intuitions that have historically led to the advent of the first emer-
gentist doctrine. It also does so while preserving some widespread intuitions
about emergence, viz. that emergents have irreducible causal powers and that,
accordingly, they are epistemologically broken off from their bases. Finally, it
does so while avoiding some traditional perplexities stemming primarily from
the commitment to the existence of a discrete hierarchy of levels in nature.
Now, all transformational emergence needs in order to be more than a nice
philosophical tool is at least one concrete empirical exemplification. We pro-
vide one in what follows.
4 Transformational emergence in the physical world
Our goal in this section is to put some scientific meat on the two requirements
(depd) and (novd) using the theoretical clues (C1) and (C2) discussed above.
We will show two things: there exists a theoretical possibility of [te] in quantum
physics (section 4.1). In particular, we will show it in the context of quantum
field theory, but it can also be achieved in non-relativistic quantum mechanics.
We will then argue that such a case has been experimentally produced (section
4.2). In other words, we believe there is empirical support for [te].
4.1 Theoretical exemplification of transformational emergence
We will argue that if a certain physical transformation [Tr] could transform
a physical system in state S1, dynamically described by a model of quantum
electrodynamics in 3+1 dimensions (QED4), into the same physical system
in a state S2, dynamically described by a model of quantum electrodynamics
in 2+1 dimensions (QED3), then this transformation should be considered as
leading to [te].
The first step is to show that such a [Tr] meets (depd) and, in particular,
the clue (C1) it is associated with. In this regard, we claim that QED4 and
QED3 are both models of one and the same non-trivial theory T , namely
QED, the general quantum field theory that characterizes electromagnetic in-
teractions. QED is defined as the quantum field theory for which the following
– not necessarily independent – requirements are true:
16 That’d better be the case, for, as we will see, people won the Nobel prize for their
discovery and account of phenomena that we will qualify as transformationally emergent.
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Fig. 5 Theoretical exemplification of [te].
1. Poincare´ invariance. The dynamics should be invariant under translation
in time and space, rotations in space and boosts. Obviously the exact
composition of the symmetry group will depend of the dimensionality of
spacetime.
2. U(1) local gauge invariance. The theory should be invariant under the
following transformations: Aµ → Aµ + 1e∂µΩ, ψ → eiΩψ, where Aµ is
the gauge potential, ψ the matter field, e the electric charge associated
with matter, and Ω a smooth function of the spacetime manifold. This
symmetry is the signature of an electromagnetic interaction.
3. Minimal coupling. The interacting term in the Lagrangian density should
be of the form LI = −JµAµ, where Jµ is the charged particles’ current.
In other words, Aµ acts geometrically like a connection in a principal fibre
bundle. This requirement aims to exclude exotic interaction terms that
would not be assimilable to electromagnetism.
4. The gauge equations are of the Maxwell type. The equations of
movement for the gauge field do not make reference to the vector potential
but only to the the field-strength tensor. In 3+1 dimensions, we should
obtain the Maxwell equations and the known Bianchi identity for the dual
field-strength tensor.
5. Usual matter solutions. For example, in the case of massive spinor
electrodynamics, the matter terms of the Lagrangian should be LM =
ψ¯(i/∂ − m)ψ, where m is the matter mass. This choice guarantees that
in absence of electromagnetic interaction, the Dirac equation will be the
Euler-Lagrange equation. A similar requirement goes for other kinds of
matter. This necessary condition excludes the possibility of introducing
exotic matter directly into the Lagrangian. Possible new matter solutions
could only come through new solutions to the same Lagrangian ingredients.
This condition is not as fundamental as the others and could be relaxed.
Together, these five requirements theoretically circumscribe a type of phe-
nomenon. Any model/theory falling under these describes a type of quantum
electrodynamics phenomenon.
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Obviously, QED4 (electrodynamics of fermions) is a model of QED. But
what about QED3? Let us look at a particular model. What follows is the
Lagrangian density of a QED3 model for spinors:
LQED3 = LMatter + LInteraction + LGauge
= ψ¯(i/∂ −m)ψ − JµAµ + 1
4
(Fµν)
2 +
θ
4
εαµνAαFµν ,
where θ is a constant and εαµν is the total antisymmetric tensor. The last
term of the Lagrangian is called the Chern-Simons term.
Let us check whether this L meets the definitional requirements of QED.
This Lagrangian density is clearly Poincare´ invariant (1). LM + LI is gauge
invariant. As for LG, it transforms by a total derivative in the following way:
LG → LG + ∂α( θ4eεαµνFµνΩ). For vanishing Fµν and Ω at the borders, this
derivative equals 0 (2). We have a minimal coupling (3). The Euler-Lagrange
equations for the gauge field are of the Maxwell type (4). Finally, LM generates
the Dirac equation if we use the 2-dimensional realization of the Dirac algebra
for the γ matrix and a dimensionally-reduced ψ (5).
Before going further, let us note some characteristics of the Chern-Simons
term:
– It is topological, that is, it does not depend on the spacetime metric and
does not contribute to the energy. It only depends on the topology of the
spacetime manifold.
– It generates a topological mass for the “photon” (spin 1 excitation states
of the gauge field) (Deser, Jackiw & Templeton 2000).
– It endows the “charged particles” with magnetic fluxes (Deser, Jackiw
& Templeton 2000). These composite flex-tube-particles have fractional
statistics (Wilczek 1982). As far as we know, this possibility does not ex-
ist in 3+1 dimensions. We would even affirm that this modality should
be interpreted strongly. If we cannot invoke a no-go theorem excluding
the possibility of fractional statistics for all models of QED in 3+1 dimen-
sions, the constraints put on this possibility by topological arguments in the
context of non-relativistic quantum mechanics seem difficult to overcome
(MacKenzie 2000). In consequence, we will assume that in 3+1 dimensions,
only two kinds of statistics exist.17
Before discussing (C2), let us address a worry. If we have good reasons to
believe that QED3 is well behaved, we have even better reasons to believe
this is not the case for QED4. Indeed, Haag’s theorem asserts that no unitar-
ily consistent representation of QED4 could include interacting and free fields
(Earman & Fraser 2006). However, both ingredients seem necessary, especially
if one wants to interpret QED4 in terms of particles. Our response is to notice
that this result should not be interpreted as a logical inconsistency of QED4
17 Note that the long range interaction implied here does not contradict the second char-
acteristics above because the interaction necessary for the fractional statistics is of the
Aharonov-Bohm type and, in consequence, does not require displacement of energy.
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in general. The theorem does not exclude the possibility of finding adequate
representations for free or interacting fields. It only asserts that these repre-
sentations will not be unitarily equivalent. The remarkable success of certain
applications of QED4 proves that this model is at least consistent in limited
domains. In this context, the more economical solution is to sustain a local
approach of veracity (see Ruetsche 2015).
Now that we’ve shown that (C1) holds and that, consequently, (depd) can
be supported, let us turn to (novd). We need to show that, following (C2) and
with regard to the [Tr] envisioned here, it should not be possible to obtain
QED3 from QED4 and, moreover, there is no continuous limit that could
get QED3 from QED4, to the effect that one should not consider QED3
as just being QED4 with one less dimension. A 2+1-dimensional quantum
system is not just a restricted 3+1-dimensional quantum system. This is due
to the presence of a new topological term in the Lagrangian, depending on
the dimensionality, which is responsible for the fact that QED3 exhibit new
topological orders, new possible states of matter, that are not accessible to
systems modeled by QED4.
Since topological orders are not as known as more traditional states of
matter, let us say a few words to define what they are.18 Topological orders
are quantum states of matter that cannot be completely characterized by
symmetry breaking of (local) order parameters. They are a subset of quantum
orders in which all excitations have finite energy gaps. The associated quantum
phase transitions are defined by the singularities of the ground-state energy as
a function of the parameters of the Hamiltonian. This made Xiao-Gang Wen
assert that “the concept of topological order is (partially) defined by ground-
state degeneracy, which is robust against any perturbations that can break all
of the symmetries” (2004, p. 342).
As it has been well shown by studies in topological quantum field the-
ory, even if the Chern-Simons term does not contribute to the Hamiltonian,
it makes a significative difference to the ground-state degeneracy. In other
words, it does contribute in a significant way to the structure of the ground
state (Witten 1989; Fro¨lich & King 1989). In fact, when the Chern-Simons
term does not vanish, the physical system can exhibit new states of matter
as a topological quantum fluid (Zee 2010, pp. 322-330). These states are not
accessible to a physical system described by QED4. Furthermore, these states
are forbidden in QED4, since they can exhibit fractional statistics. QED4 is
topologically limited to Bose-Einstein and Fermi-Dirac statistics.
In summary, if there exists a physical transformation [Tr] able to make a
system in state S1, for which the dynamics is described by QED4, becomes in
state S2, for which the dynamics is described by QED3 with a non vanishing
Chern-Simons term, then this situation should be interpreted as a case of [te].
18 For a good survey of orders based on symmetry breaking, see Chaikin & Lubensky
[1998].
A New Look at Emergence. Or When After is Different 21
4.2 The empirical support for transformational emergence
The fractional quantum Hall effect (hereafter FQH effect), discovered exper-
imentally in 1982 by Tsui and Sto¨ner, is, at first sight, a variation of the
integer quantum Hall effect where the Hall conductance takes fractional val-
ues of e2/h. All FQH states share the same symmetry. They possess a rich
internal structure of patterns but cannot be qualified as solid. They are quan-
tum fluids. These patterns are dynamical. The particular structure depends of
the ground-state degeneracy which is robust against perturbation. According
to Wen, this robustness is the sign of universal internal structures, namely
topological orders (2004, p. 342).
A detailed description of the FQH effect is beyond the scope of this paper.
We refer the interested reader to the relevant sections of Lederer (2015). Let
us just say that in the initial state S1, we start with an electron gas in a
conductor. The behavior of this gas is modeled by QED4. [Tr] consists in the
experimental manipulations on this system in order to get one of the states
exhibiting a FQH effect, typically we impose a very strong magnetic field
perpendicular to the conductor, confine the electrons to a thin spatial slice by
controlling the electronic band structure, work at a low enough temperature,
inject a current and measure the resistance perpendicular to the current and
the magnetic field. If the experiment is a success, the state S2 obtained is a
quantum fluid exhibiting fractional statistics.
It has been shown that a pure Chern-Simons theory (with only Chern-
Simons terms) is an adequate effective theory to capture the universal proper-
ties of the FQH state (Schakel 2008). However, this theory is not rich enough to
describe the complex dynamics involved in the effect. To do so, we have to add
to the pure Chern-Simons theory an interaction term between the gauge field
included in the Chern-Simons terms and the matter field. We have also to add
kinetic/potential terms for the charged matter (Arovas, Schrieffer & Wilczek
1984; Wen 2004). In fact, this more complete effective theory is a particular
case of QED3 without the kinetic term for the electromagnetic field and with
a connection to a classical external magnetic field (both facts are expected
in the particular experimental conditions of the effect). Note again that in
this model, even if we start with matter fields represented by spinors, we can
obtain non fermionic (or even bosonic) solutions, namely anyons. This is why
the discovery of the FQH effect was such a surprise. It is the manifestation in
our 3+1-dimensional world of a kind of physics that theoretically could only
exist in 2+1 dimensions. The FQH experimental setup is an exemplification of
[Tr]. We interpret the fact that this effect has been experimentally produced
as an empirical proof that a case of [te] exists.19
19 A similar claim has been made recently by Lancaster and Pexton (2015). According to
them, fractional quantum Hall states can be said to be emergent in a sense “E3” that they
construe as a modification of Humphreys’ original fusion account, where basal properties are
not lost upon emergence, but rather become “inherently relational” (due to a specific kind
of entanglement at play, viz. long-range entanglement that characterize topological states
of matter). Such an account of the emergence involved in the fractional quantum Hall effect
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Before going further, let us discuss some possible objections.20 1) We have
described the FQH experimental setup as an exemplification of the passage
from a state described by QED4 to a state described by QED3. But before the
application of the magnetic field, the conductor is probably already planar. In
these circumstances, why not have as a initial model a 2+1-dimensional model,
and thus avoid the problems related to Haag’s theorem discussed above? It
might be possible to exemplify an appropriate modality difference for [TE]
between two 2+1-dimensional models of QED. However, it is not clear how we
could prove that the initial state is best described by a 2+1-dimensional model.
A planar space seems necessary to be able to describe the FQH effect, and it is
not the case for a very thin conductor.21 Therefore, this seems less controversial
to start from a 3+1-dimensional model. 2) In solid state physics, because of the
nature of the systems studied, non-relativistic quantum models (finite number
of degrees of freedom) are preferable to quantum field models (infinite degrees
of freedom). This point does not mean that the FQH effect is not a case
of transformational emergence, but that our theoretical representation of the
transformation is maybe not the best one. As mentioned below, it is possible to
make the same argument in the context of non-relativistic quantum mechanics.
Nevertheless, it is much easier to show the modal difference between initial and
final states in the context of a quantum field model. This is why we have made
this choice. 3) QED3 and QED4 are Poincare´ invariant. The setup of the FQH
effect is not. In fact, non-trivial boundary conditions are essential features to
understand certain aspects of the effect (Wen 2004, chapter 7). Are the chosen
models of QED adequate for our purpose? We have not claimed that QED3
and QED4 model the FQH experimental setup in detail. But as we discussed
above, they capture well the universal properties of the system in the initial
and final states. If our goal was to describe specific aspects of the effect, for
example to compute the ground state energy, we would have chosen other
models.
We have explained this example using quantum field theory but a similar
demonstration could have been done using non-relativistic quantum mechan-
ics. The surprise would have been the same, as it is expressed by the following
quote by Laughlin taken from his Nobel lecture (1999, p. 869):
The fractional quantum Hall state is not adiabatically deformable to
any noninteracting electron state. I am always astonished at how upset
people get over this statement, for with a proper definition of a state
of matter and a full understanding of the integral quantum Hall ef-
fect there is no other possible conclusion. The Hall conductance would
necessarily be quantized to an integer because it is conserved by the
adiabatic map and is an integer in the noninteracting limit by virtue
of gauge invariance and the discreteness of the electron charge. So the
differs from ours in an important respect: as with fusion emergence, it is essentially holistic
and hierarchical (with levels failing to be related by a relation of mereological supervenience).
20 We thank an anonymous reviewer for having drawn our attention to these possible
worries.
21 More on the 2-dimensional idealization can be found in Shech (2015).
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fractional quantum Hall state is something unprecedented – a new state
of matter.
Before closing this subsection, we have to answer to a legitimate objection.
Is a diachronic conception of emergence necessary to interpret the FQH effect
or could we have used a synchronic one? After all, Laughlin himself seems
to have such a conception in mind. Moreover, this option seems particularly
appealing if we understand the FQH effect in terms of emergent entities rather
than emergent states or dynamics. For example, if anyons are emerging from a
base of electrons, the QFH effect could be understood as a case of synchronic
emergence. We have two objections to this line of thought.
– Examples of models where anyons are understood as collective behaviors
of other entities or fields presume, to our knowledge, that the base is 2+1-
dimensional (e.g. see Jain 1989; Fro¨hlich & Marchetti 1989). This is not
surprising since anyons cannot exist in 3+1 dimensions. This makes the
status of the putative emergence base a problem. Are anyons emerging
from 3+1-dimensional or 2+1-dimensional electrons? It is only the later
option that seems theoretically justified. But opting for it pushes us to-
wards diachronic emergence. These 2+1-dimensional electrons are indeed
not just 3+1-dimensional electrons with one dimension less, since the for-
mers have the capacity to generate anyons, a capacity that the laters do
not – and even, as we have seen, cannot – have. Consequently, the experi-
mental confinement of 3+1-dimensional electrons is a transformation that
generate new capacities. This confinement is the crucial first step to pro-
duce the emergent physics. It should be understood as a diachronic process
of emergence.
– The second objection is even stronger. In the context of the FQH effect, the
dependance relation between 2+1-dimensional electrons and anyons could
go both ways, in the sense that not only one could conceive of anyons
as collectives of 2+1-dimensional electrons, but 2+1-dimensional electrons
could also be seen as the results of the composition of a certain number of
anyons. For example, in a FQH state where anyons possess a charge of 1/3
of an electron and exhibit a statistics of 1/3, three of them can combine
and form a bound object that would be identified to a 2+1-dimensional
electron (Zee 2010, p. 326-327). This may be surprising but not totally
unexpected in a quantum field context where particles are only types of
fields configurations. What matters here is that such a fact is inconsistent
with conceiving of the FQH effect as a case of purely synchronic emergence,
for the dependance relation (deps) usually appealed to in this context – e.g.
supervenience or realization – doesn’t allow for such a symmetry between
the putative synchronic emergents (anyons) and the putative emergence
basis (2+1-dimensional electrons).
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4.3 Another emergentist approach to the FQH effect
In a recent paper, Jonathan Bain used the FQH effect as a concrete example
of emergence (2013). His philosophical conception of what is emergence is not
easy to pinpoint since he moves swiftly and seemingly between epistemological
(non-deducibility) and ontological (dynamical distinctiveness) considerations.
Nevertheless, his treatment of the FQH effect is relatively clear.
Bain notes that a pure Chern-Simons theory captures well the universal
features of the FQH effect. It does not fully describe the effect but it is a
good effective field theory (hereafter EFT). He also notes that the high-energy
degrees of freedom of the system are more fully described by a type of nonrela-
tivistic QED3. For Bain, the emergence involved is not the process of passing
from a state (best) described by QED4 to a state (best) described by QED3,
but from a state (best) described by QED3 to a state (best) described by a
pure Chern-Simons theory (the EFT), that is from a theory with a Chern-
Simons term to a theory with only Chern-Simons terms.22 Why should we
consider such a process as emergent?
First, the dependence clause is easily filled. The pure Chern-Simons theory
is an effective theory of QED3. The degrees of freedom of QED3 can be
identified as low-energy degrees of freedom of the pure Chern-Simons theory.
In consequence, both theories describe the same kind of phenomena. It is
the novelty clause that is more problematic. The theories/models involved
are of course different. For example, one is purely topological, the other is
not. Because of these apparent differences, Bain claims that both theories are
dynamically distinct. But is it enough to have emergence? Indeed the EFT
describes important features of the FQH effect, but who would claim that this
pure topological theory describes more than the qualitative features of the
dynamics? On the contrary, as we have argued in the preceding subsection,
a more complete effective theory must include kinematic terms and therefore
not be purely topological. Bain goes as far to say that
Dynamical distinctness, coupled with the formal distinction between
the field ψ that encodes the degrees of freedom of the high-energy the-
ory and the fields aµ, (Aµ + aµ) that encode the degrees of freedom
of the EFT, suggest that the later characterizes physical systems (i.e.,
two topological Chern-Simons fields) that are ontologically distinct from
those characterized by the former (i.e., non-relativistic composite elec-
trons). (Bain p.264 [2013])
This quote is puzzling. What kind of dynamical distinctiveness and formal
distinction are strong enough to be qualified as emergent? In what way is
a formal difference ontologically significative? These questions are however
unavoidable since too weak of an answer will make emergence ubiquitous.
For example, in many contexts, one can describe electrons with a scalar field.
This is perfectly reasonable if the spin does not play a important role in the
22 Because of the coupling to the external magnetic field, there is more than one Chern-
Simons term.
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phenomenon under study. Are these cases emergent? They are in principle
formally and dynamically distinct – in the sense that they do not exhibit
the same statistics – from a description of the system that includes spinors.
This is why we included a modality aspect to the novelty clause of [te]. The
new system should not only be distinct but in a certain way forbidden. The
two theories used in Bain’s reconstruction, QED3 and the pure Chern-Simons
theory, do not have this property.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we have provided a new account of emergence – “transfor-
mational emergence” – that captures the very hallmarks of the notion in a
diachronic, weakly ontological sense. As such, the proposed account encapsu-
lates a perspective shift from the most widespread, hierarchical and synchronic
view according to which “more is different”, to a non-holistic and dynamical
perspective in the light of which “after is different”. As we have shown, this
new way of looking at emergence achieves the tour de force of being at the
same time empirically well-supported and faithful to most of the emergentist
intuitions. Accordingly, [te] turns out to be philosophically fruitful and scien-
tifically respectful, and should therefore be taken as a new serious contender
in the debates.
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